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G & S considered the problem of matching
several students to several colleges,
according to preferences of each, where
the colleges each had a specific quota.



An instance of "instability": there are two
students α and β who are matched to
colleges A and B, resp., but β prefers A to B
and A prefers β to α



A matching of students to colleges is
considered "unstable" if there is any instance
of instability. It is called "stable" otherwise.



Can we always find a matching that is
stable?

GALE & SHAPLEY
College Admissions and the
Stability of Marriage



Remarkably, stability is always achievable, no
matter the preferences of students/colleges!



G & S showed this by actually describing an
algorithm (GS) that found a specific stable
matching.



To simplify the analysis, they initially changed
the situation: n students and n colleges, each
with a quota of 1.



Like "marriages"!



"students" = "men", "colleges" = "women"



We will return to the original question later, but
this is more fun.



Here, an "unstable matching" means that
there is some man α and some woman A that
prefer each other to their assigned match.

GALE & SHAPLEY
College Admissions and the
Stability of Marriage

1.

What if there is a man and a woman that prefer each other
best? What must be true in any matching that hopes to achieve
stability?

2.

What if the preference lists for the men and woman are all the
same?

SOME THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS



Men propose to women simultaneously in "rounds."



In round 1, each man proposes to his top woman.



Each woman evaluates her proposals (if any), and accepts the best,
rejecting all others. These women are now "engaged."



In round 2, each rejected man now proposes (simultaneously) to his
second choice; his first choice didn't work out.



Each woman evaluates her proposals, even if currently engaged,
and accepts the best, breaking an engagement if necessary.



Rounds continue so long as there are still rejected men left to
propose, or equivalently until each woman has received a proposal.



Once each woman is engaged, the mass wedding takes place!

GS "DEFERRED-ACCEPTANCE" OR
"PROPOSAL" ALGORITHM

1.

It always terminates, in fact in at most (n-1)( n-1)+1 rounds. Why?

2.

What about the average/mean/expected number of rounds?

3.

It delivers a stable matching. Why?

4.

Clearly, men and women can exchange roles, and the women
could propose instead. The GS algorithm is "proposer optimal" in
the sense that the proposing group simultaneously do as good as
each can in any stable matching. Why?

5.

It is "proposee floptimal" in the sense that the group being
proposed to simultaneously do as badly as each can in any stable
matching. Why?

SOME FACTS ABOUT THE GS ALGORITHM
(AND SOME HOMEWORK)

 How

can we modify the GS algorithm with quotas for
colleges that are larger than 1?

BACK TO STUDENTS/COLLEGES



Stable Polygamy (multiple wives/husbands)?



Stable "Roommates" (same gender)?


Let's look more closely at this one.

OTHER APPLICATIONS TO THE
"STABILITY OF MARRIAGE"?



Suppose there are 4 girls (A, B, C, and D) that need to room
together in pairs.



Suppose A ranks B best, B ranks C best, C ranks A best, and all
three rank D worst. What will happen? Do D's rankings matter?

A "STABLE ROOMMATES" PROBLEM

"THE READER WHO HAS FOLLOWED US THIS FAR HAS DOUBTLESS NOTICED A CERTAIN TREND IN OUR
DISCUSSION. IN MAKING THE SPECIAL ASSUMPTIONS NEEDED IN ORDER TO ANALYZE OUR PROBLEM
MATHEMATICALLY, WE NECESSARILY MOVED FURTHER AWAY FROM THE ORIGINAL COLLEGE
ADMISSION QUESTION, AND EVENTUALLY IN DISCUSSING THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM, WE
ABANDONED REALITY ALTOGETHER AND ENTERED THE WORLD OF MATHEMATICAL MAKE-BELIEVE.
THE PRACTICAL-MINDED READER MAY RIGHTFULLY ASK WHETHER ANY CONTRIBUTION HAS BEEN
MADE TOWARD AN ACTUAL SOLUTION OF THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM. EVEN A ROUGH ANSWER TO
THIS QUESTION WOULD REQUIRE GOING INTO MATTERS WHICH ARE NONMATHEMATICAL, AND
SUCH DISCUSSION WOULD BE OUT OF PLACE IN A JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS. IT IS OUR OPINION,
HOWEVER, THAT SOME OF THE IDEAS INTRODUCED HERE MIGHT USEFULLY BE APPLIED TO CERTAIN
PHASES OF THE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM."
~~ GALE & SHAPLEY



Lloyd Shapley had laid the foundation in the abstract realm,
starting with his joint work with David Gale in the 1950s and 1960s.



Alvin Roth had realized, starting in the 1980s, that Shapley's
continued work could be adapted and applied in a broad
range of practical scenarios, including stable assignments of:


new doctors to hospitals (residencies, NRMP);



students to schools (school choice); and



human organs for transplant to recipients.

GALE & SHAPLEY WERE RIGHT!



Consider the preference lists to be (uniformly) random, in the n
men n women situation.



Each collection of preference lists (how many?) is called an
"instance of the stable marriage problem."



Let S be the number of stable matchings in the random instance
of the stable marriage problem.



Know: Pr(S ≥ 1) = 1.



What about the expected value of S, E[S]? Can this be
computed? If so, is E[S] indicative of a likely value for S?

PROBABILITY, ANYONE?



Donald Knuth (1976) found an integral formula for E[S].



Knuth (1978) produced a problem instance that had 2n/2 stable
matchings.



Robert Irving and Paul Leather (1986) extended Knuth’s example,
and algorithmically found problem instances with more than 2n
stable matchings.



Knuth extended the work of Irving and Leather, and showed that
their algorithm produced problem instances with at least 2.28n
stable matchings.



Open Problem: Is Irving-Leather’s problem instance best possible?

FACTS ABOUT “S”



Meanwhile, in 1972 McVitie and Wilson had found a sequential
version of the GS algorithm, where men propose one-at-a-time.



In 1990, Knuth, Motwani and Pittel extended the sequential GS
algorithm in such a way that it delivered all possible stable husbands
for any given women, and used this to show that with probability
tending to 1 the number of those stable husbands is roughly 0.5 ln n.



Thus, with high probability, S ≥ 0.5 ln n. (!!)



But later (1992) Boris Pittel showed that, actually, S ≥ (n/ln n)1/2 with
high probability.



Can we do better? That is, can we show that S is even larger with
high probability?

FACTS ABOUT “S”



Boris Pittel (1986) showed that E[S] ~ e-1n ln n by using Knuth’s
formula for E[S]. This suggests (but does not prove) that most
instances of the stable marriage problem have lots of stable
matchings.



To prove that the (asymptotic) value of E[S] is actually a likely
value, Craig Lennon and Boris Pittel (2008) managed to show that
E[S2] ~ (e-2 + 0.5e-3)n2 ln2 n.



The combination of E[S] and E[S2] imply (Cantelli’s inequality) that
at least 84% of stable marriage problem instances have cn ln n
stable matchings!

FACTS ABOUT “S”



Here, assume that there are n people of the same gender, each
with their own preference list (having ranked everyone but
themselves from best-to-worst). How many?



Each collection of preference lists represents an “instance of the
stable roommates problem.”



For a (uniformly) random problem instance, let R be the number
of stable matchings.



Know: Pr(R ≥ 1) < 1, in contrast with S.



A problem instance x is said to be “solvable” if R(x) ≥ 1, so
Pr(random problem instance x is solvable) = Pr(R ≥ 1).

WHAT ABOUT “STABLE ROOMMATES”?



cn-1/2 ≤ Pr(R ≥ 1) ≤ e1/2/2 = 0.82436…


e1/2

E[R] ~

= 1.64872… (Pittel)



Conjecture (Mertens, 2005):

Pr(S ≥ 1) = 1


Irving and Pittel









GS algorithm

E[S] ~ e-1n ln n (Pittel)


Pr(R ≥ 1) ~ cn-1/4

“R” VERSUS “S” SUMMARY

… and this is close to a likely value
(Lennon and Pittel)



WONDERFUL reference:


Dan Gusfield & Robert W. Irving, The Stable Marriage Problem:
Structure and Algorithms. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1989.

THANK YOU!

